concessions to France that did not extend to the four towns that al-Faruqi had named. The problem of Palestine cannot be solved entirely on the principles of self-determination and free choice of assistance. As in Armenia, there will be a mixed population, and there will be one element in that population, in this case the Jewish colonists, which for special reasons, will be entitled to a position more than mathematically proportionate to its numbers at the start.
Moreover, in Palestine there are international religious interests so important, and so difficult to reconcile, that they almost overshadow the internal problems of the native inhabitants. reliable. The charge that high-ranking officers and Ministers consistently and deliberately perjured themselves is to my mind inadmissible. Nor can I understand how Professor Toynbee overlooked a considerable body of evidence relating to the pre-I920 period (adduced in my article) which belies his conclusion. It would be legitimate to ask at this point why, in his 1918 memoranda, Toynbee recommended that Britain assume the role of trustee of the Jewish National Home, rather than hand Palestine to the Arabs, if he thought that it was included in the boundaries of Arab independence ?
However, his dilemma with regard to what appeared to him contradictory commitments made to
Whether or not the subject has any political bearing, is not for me to say. For me it was and remains an academic issue and I hope I treated it in that spirit. On the basis of my study I do not hesitate to state that the record of the British Government in this matter is clean. It was not McMahon's letter of 24 October 1915, unfortunate though its phrasing was, that complicated Anglo-Arab-Jewish relations, but the myth that was built up around it. If to reveal historical truth helps to create a better climate of international understanding, the labour was not in vain.
